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SIX-PERSON NONUNANIMOUS VERDICTS:
FURTHER CUTBACKS ON THE
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL?
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to Burch v. Louisiana.1 This case will enable the Court to further develop the essential characteristics of the sixth amendment right to jury trial. 2
This Note examines the issues the Supreme Court will be addressing in Burch.
The right to jury trial has been acclaimed "fundamental to the
American scheme of justice," 3 "essential for preventing miscarriages of justice," 4 and necessary "to prevent oppression by the
Government." 5 Divergent opinions exist concerning the scope of
this constitutional protection. The cases decided prior to 1970 reflect the judicial assumption that the right to jury trial has always
included the guarantee of a unanimous verdict rendered by twelve
impartial lay persons; 6 however, the right to trial by jury has been
1. 47 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-90).
2. The full text of the sixth amendment reads as followsIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

This Note addresses only those issues pertaining to the sixth amendment right to
jury trial in criminal cases, although many of the issues discussed and the sources
cited are relevant to the seventh amendment right to jury trial in civil eases as well.
For the leading case on the current status of size requirements for juries in civil
cases, see Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
3. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
4. Id. at 158.
5. Id. at 155 (footnote omitted).
6. See, e.g., Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948); Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898). The right to
jury trial did not always include the right to an impartially chosen jury from a representative cross section of the community, without regard to race or sex; however,
this matter is not discussed in this Note. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880), struck down state jury selection regulations that explicitly discriminated on
the basis of race. The Court later held unconstitutional jury selection systems where
a racially discriminatory pattern of administration was shown, although the law itself
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significantly redefined in a series of recent Supreme Court deci-

sions. 7 These cases question whether reductions in jury size 8 or
majority rather than unanimous verdicts9 violate the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 10 To date, the Supreme Court has held that
criminal convictions resulting from both nonunanimous twelveperson juries"

and six-person unanimous juries'

2

are constitu-

tional, whereas verdicts rendered by unanimous five-person juries
are unconstitutional. 13 The extent to which further deviations from
the traditional unanimous twelve-person model will be sanctioned
is unresolved.
In Burch v. Louisiana, 14 the Court will consider the constitutionality of a provision in the Louisiana Constitution 15 which perwas not overtly discriminatory. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970);
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975) (jury selection system which imposes barriers to jury service by women is
unconstitutional).
7. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972) (plurality opinion); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
8. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970).
9. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
10. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1967), the Court extended the sixth
amendment's provision for jury trial to the states via the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause. The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
12. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
13. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
14. State v. Wrestle, Inc., 360 So. 2d 831 (La. 1978), cert. granted sub nom.
Burch v. Louisiana, 47 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-90).
15. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17, provides:
Section 17. A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital
shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to
render a verdict. A case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement
at hard labor shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom
must concur to render a verdict. A case in which the punishment may be
confinement at hard labor or confinement without hard labor for more than
six months shall be tried before a jury of six persons, five of whom must
concur to render a verdict. The accused shall have the right to full voir dire
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mits a criminal conviction by a verdict rendered by five votes of a
six-person jury. This five-out-of-six jury system presents a compos16
ite of the two previously sanctioned "jury enfeebling measures":
the nonunanimous twelve-person model 17 and the unanimous sixmember system.18 Thus, to assess the constitutionality of a criminal
conviction based on five votes of a six-person jury, it is necessary
to explore the theories advanced by the Court in sanctioning unanimous six-person panels and nonunanimous twelve-person verdicts
and to harmonize these rationales with the Court's recent decision
invalidating a five-person jury system.' 9
Although the Supreme Court has sanctioned nonunanimous
verdicts by twelve-person juries20 and unanimous six-person verdicts, the Louisiana arrangement is constitutionally offensive in
light of underlying theories the Court advanced in those decisions.
The defects of a five-person unanimous panel cannot be cured by
adding another person to the jury without a means of insuring that
the contributions of the additional member will be reflected in the
final verdict that emerges from the deliberative process.
Although this argument assumes the soundness of the "juryenfeebling" cases, this Note additionally suggests that serious questions have been raised concerning the validity of the factual premises relied on by the Court in sanctioning substantial deviations
examination of prospective jurors and to challenge jurors peremptorily. The

number of challenges shall be fixed by law. Except in capital cases, a defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a trial by jury.
Id. (emphasis added).
Other state statutes and constitutions which permit variations from unanimous
12-member juries follow a pattern similar to that contained in the Louisiana provision. Crimes of the most serious nature are tried before 12-member panels who must
reach a unanimous verdict; however, less serious crimes are tried before juries with
less strict criteria. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.10 (West 1973); GA. CONST. art. 6, §
15, para. 1 (codified in GA. CODE ANN. § 2-4401 (1977)); OR. CONST. art. 1, § 11. Petitioner in Johnson argued that treating capital offenders differently from other offenders is a denial of equal protection. However, the Supreme Court has rejected the
argument that providing distinctive jury features for varying degrees of offenses is violative of the equal protection clause. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363-65
(1972).
16. The phrase is Professor Zeisel's and refers to any deviation from the
12-member unanimous jury. See Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The
Diminution of the Federaljury, 38 U. Ci. L. 1Ev. 710, 723 (1971).
17. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
18. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
19. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
20. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
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from the traditional unanimous twelve-person model. 21 Therefore,
reliance on the precedential value of these decisions may be misplaced. Although it is unlikely that these cases will be reversed in
the foreseeable future, there is some indication that the Court in
Burch will not approve further limitations on the right to jury trial,
and will resist suggestions that deviations from presently permitted
jury systems follow logically from the earlier opinions. 22
HISTORICAL MEANING OF THE RIGHT TO JURY

TRIAL

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution affords
all criminal defendants "the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed." 23 Until recently, the Supreme Court had
not explicitly determined the characteristics of a jury necessary to
satisfy sixth amendment requirements. Rather, early decisions of
the Court were based on the unquestioned assumption that certain
attributes are constitutionally mandated. 24 Seemingly unchallengeable was the notion that the sixth amendment guarantees that a
criminal conviction can result only from the unanimous agreement
of a twelve-member jury. 25 Speaking for the Court in Thompson v.
Utah,26 Justice Harlan observed: "[T]he Constitution of the United
States gave the accused, at the time of the commission of his offence, the right to be tried by a jury of twelve persons, and made
it impossible to deprive him of his liberty except by the unanimous
21. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 n.10 (1978).
22. Given the difficulty of reconciling Ballew with prior cases dealing with
"jury enfeebling measures," this is one possible interpretation of the holding that
unanimous five-person jury verdicts are unconstitutional. See text accompanying
notes 69-82 infra.
23. U.S. CONST. amend, VI. See note 2 supra.
24. See notes 25-34 infra and accompanying text.
25. Speaking for the Court in Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930),
Justice Sutherland observed that it is "not open to question" whether the phrase
"trial by jury" in the sixth amendment embraces a unanimous verdict rendered by a
12-person jury. In the majority opinion in Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740
(1948), Justice Reed stated that "[ulnanimity in jury verdicts is required where the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply." Id. at 748 (footnote omitted). In Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 609 (1900), Justice Harlan noted in dissent;
[W]e have held that the jury here referred to was a common law jury consisting of neither more or less than twelve persons, whose unanimous verdict
was necessary to acquit or convict the accused; that a jury of less number
was not admissible . . . in any court organized under the authority of the

United States.
Id. at 609 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See also cases cited note 6
supra.
26. 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
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verdict of such a jury."2 7
There is a noticeable lack of early cases challenging the view
that the sixth amendment mandates a verdict rendered by a unanimous twelve-member body: Such juries must have been considered axiomatic to any definition of the sixth amendment protection.
Until very recently, the Supreme Court had never directly considered whether a twelve-person unanimous verdict was constitutionally compelled or merely a historical remnant devoid of legal significance. However, because the Court had been called upon to
decide this issue indirectly, it is apparent that the Court assumed
that these features are necessary components of a jury. Those cases
which arose before the sixth amendment right to jury trial was applied to the states, 28 and which considered whether a criminal proceeding is governed by state laws at variance with the twelveperson unanimity requirement or by federal law, never questioned
the premise that the sixth amendment requires twelve-person
unanimous verdicts. Rather, it was implicitly understood by both
parties that the federal twelve-person unanimous model is mandated by the sixth amendment. 29 The Court sanctioned eightmember juries where it concluded the sixth amendment was not
32
31
determinative, 30 yet held unconstitutional six- and eight-person
juries where it found the sixth amendment did apply. In addition,
nonunanimous verdicts were held unconstitutional where the federal constitutional standard governed. 33 The notion that the sixth
amendment guarantees a unanimous verdict of a twelve-member
body was so deeply ingrained in constitutional history that the Supreme Court even grappled with the constitutionality of allowing a
34
criminal defendant to waive this protection.
It therefore is clear that in the earlier cases, the constitutional
27. Id. at 355.
28. The sixth amendment right to jury trial was held applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See
notes 37-47 infra and accompanying text.
29. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948); Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276 (1930); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
30. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
31. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
32. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
33. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948).
34. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). The Court upheld the
constitutionality of an 11-member jury where a criminal defendant in federal court
waived his right to a verdict rendered by 12 jurors when one juror became ill
during the trial. Id. at 299.
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concept of trial by jury paralleled the essential features of a jury

trial at common law as described by Blackstone in the eighteenth
century: "[T]he truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the

shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be
confirmed by the unanimous sufferage of twelve of [defendant's]
equals and neighbors, indifferently chosen, and superior to all suspicion." 35 Although the law appeared to be settled on this point,
the Supreme Court opened the floodgates to a stream of challenges

questioning the constitutional necessity of the twelve-person unanimous model once the protections of the sixth amendment were ex-

tended to state criminal proceedings by the due process clause of
6
the fourteenth amendment.3

CURRENT STATUS OF SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

GeneralApplicability to the States
In the seminal case of Duncan v. Louisiana,3 ' the Supreme

Court announced that the sixth amendment right to jury trial extends to state criminal proceedings. 3 8 The full ramifications of the

Duncan decision were not immediately discernible, since Duncan
held only that a state violates the fourteenth amendment guarantee
of due process of law if it denies a criminal defendant a jury trial

when the crime charged is of a serious nature. 39 The seven Justices
concurring in the decision advanced various rationales for the holding, 40 but the Court left unsettled the question whether state jury
trials must be identical to federal jury trials in all respects, 4 ' or
35. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 349-50, quoted in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968).
36. See note 28 supra.
37. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
38. Id. at 149.
39. Id. at 156. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the Court held that
a state must provide a trial by jury for any offense with a possible penalty in excess of
six months, regardless of whether the state labels the offense petty or nonpetty. Id.
at 69.
40. Justice White, in the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Brennan and Marshall, intimated that the same standard should be applied

in federal and state proceedings. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 158. Justice Black,
in an opinion joined by Justice Douglas, argued that the fourteenth amendment
makes all of the Bill of Rights provisions fully applicable to the states. Id. at 163-71
(Black, J., concurring). Justice Fortas concurred in the Court's opinion, but saw no
reason to conclude that the features of the federal jury trial should automatically be
applied to the states. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 213 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring). Bloom was a companion case to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and
Justice Fortas' concurring opinion in Bloom was also applicable to Duncan.
41. In Duncan Justice Black expressed the view that the requirements should
be identical. See note 40 supra.
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whether states may formulate their own standards for jury trials within broad limits.4 Thus Duncan did not resolve the constitutional
status of state statutes which permitted verdicts in criminal cases
either by nonunanimous twelve-member juries or by unanimous
juries of fewer than twelve members.
Based on the pre-Duncan decisions previously discussed,43 it
appeared unquestionable that the sixth amendment, as applied to
federal criminal proceedings, included the right to a unanimous
twelve-member panel. Thus, it seemed that the extent to which
the sixth amendment was incorporated in the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment would be determinative of the constitutionality of various state jury systems. If Duncan were interpreted
as requiring only a vague, undefined right to jury trial for a defendant in a state proceeding, without reference to the specific federal requirement, then the Court's prior interpretations of the sixth
amendment would be of limited assistance in determining the constitutionality of various features of the jury in the context of the
alternative state systems.44 Instead, a case-by-case analysis would
be necessary to ascertain whether the particular jury feature at issue is fundamental to a fair trial and therefore incorporated into
the due process clause, irrespective of its relation to the sixth
amendment. 45 If, however, the sixth amendment applied "jot for
jot"4 6 to the states, substantial authority suggested that state crimi-

nal convictions could result only from the unanimous verdict of a
twelve-member jury. 47
As the Court confronted these issues in subsequent cases, a
majority concluded that the sixth amendment applies uniformly to
federal and state court jury trials. However, the historically rooted
unanimous twelve-person panel was abruptly deleted from the
Court's formulation of the sixth amendment protection.4 8 Justice
42. This is the view expressed by Justice Fortas in Duncan and Bloom. See
note 40 supra.
43. See notes 24-34 supra and accompanying text.
44. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 213-14 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring)
(concurring also in Duncan).
45. See id. at 214-15 (Fortas, J., concurring) (concurring also in Duncan).
46. "Jot for jot" is the commonly used shorthand expression of the view that
every feature of the federal protection applies in exactly the same manner to the
states once the protection is incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. See
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), where Justice
Harlan characterizes the total incorporation view as the "jot for jot" approach. For
explanation of the total incorporation or "jot for jot" approach, see id. at 162-71
(Black, J., concurring).
47. See notes 24-34 supra and accompanying text.
48. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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White's majority opinion in Williams v. Florida4 9 held unanimous
verdicts rendered by six-member juries constitutional; his opinions
for the Court in the companion cases ofJohnson v. Louisiana50 and
Apodaca v. Oregon5 l upheld the constitutionality of nonunanimous twelve-member juries. In holding these alternative jury
systems constitutional, the Court relegated to dicta a century of au52
thority to the contrary.
Reductions in Jury Size
In Williams v. Florida,53 the Court, by a seven-to-one vote,
upheld the constitutionality of a Florida statute permitting sixperson unanimous juries to render verdicts in criminal proceedings. 5 4 A majority of the Court adopted the view that the sixth
amendment right to jury trial is fully incorporated into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment; therefore, the same
standard applies in the state and federal proceedings. The Court
found, however, that the standard relating to the number of jurors
was undefined. 55 Determining that the Framers' intent regarding
the twelve-member panel is unclear, 5 6 and that the number twelve
is without meaningful historical significance, 57 the Court concluded
that this "accidental feature" of the jury has not been "immutably
codified into our Constitution"; 58 rather it is constitutionally
compelled only if necessary to insure the proper functioning of
the jury. 59 To determine if twelve jurors are constitutionally
compelled, the Court focused on the relationship between the
twelve-person panel and the purposes to be served by the jury:
[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense
judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's de49. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

406 U.S. 356 (1972).
406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion).
See notes 24-34 supra and accompanying text.
399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Section 913.10 of Florida's criminal procedure code provides as follows:

"Twelve persons shall constitute a jury to try all capital cases, and six persons shall
constitute a jury to try all other criminal cases." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.10 (West
1973).
55. 399 U.S. at 86-87.
56. Id. at 92-99. The Court characterized "the intent of the Framers" as an

"elusive quarry." Id. at 92.
57. Id. at 87-90.
58, Id. at 90, 100.
59. Id. at 99-100.
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termination of guilt or innocence. The performance of this role is

not a function of the particular number of the body that makes
up the jury. To be sure, the number should probably be large
enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for ob60
taining a representative cross-section of the community.

The Court found "no discernible difference" 61 between six- and
twelve-person juries that jeopardizes this function of the jury. It is

significant that the validity of the Court's reasoning is contingent
on an empirically verifiable assumption-that the two differentlysized groups are functionally equivalent-rather than on historical
or theoretical grounds.
Eight years after Williams the Court rejected any further reduction in jury size in Ballew v. Georgia.62 In the intervening
period between the two cases, reams of social science data had
been compiled comparing and contrasting various attributes of sixand twelve-person juries. 63 Announcing the judgment in Ballew,
Justice Blackmun reviewed many of the findings of this empirical
research. These included the following: (1) There is a positive relationship between group size and group productivity and performance; therefore, as jury size decreases, it is less likely that
effective group deliberations will occur;64 (2) a decrease in group
size reduces the reliability, accuracy, and consistency of jury decisions; 65 (3) the chances for a hung jury decline as the number of jurors decreases; 66 and (4) the chances for minority representation
67
decline absolutely and proportionately as jury size declines.
This social science data demonstrates the dubious validity of
the Court's original assertion that juries of various sizes are functionally equivalent. In light of this data, Justice Blackmun concluded: "[A]ny further reduction that prompts inaccurate and possibly biased decisionmaking, that causes untoward differences in
verdicts, and that prevents juries from truly representing their
communities, attains constitutional significance." 68 Although the
empirical data relied on by Justice Blackmun indicates that far
greater disparities exist between twelve- and six-person juries than
60. Id. at 100.
61. Id. at 101.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

435 U.S. 223 (1978).
See generally id. at 231 n.10, 233 nn.11 & 12, and studies cited therein.
Id. at 232-33.
Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 239.
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the Williams decision assumed, 69 the Court managed to reaffirm
the constitutional validity of the six-member panel approved in
Williams7" as it rejected the five-member panel in Ballew. 71 This
prompted criticisms such as the following:
Such a statement [that twelve- and six-person juries are
functionally equivalent whereas six- and five-person juries are
not] implies that the jump from 12 to six has a zero effect on the
verdicts, but the step from six to five would have an effect. Nowhere in nature or in society do we know of an organism or an
institution displaying such strange behavior. The expectation,
therefore, is that the jump from 12 to six will make a difference .... 72

The Court's analysis in Ballew fails to distinguish logically between
six- and five-member juries. It simply does not provide a basis for
prohibiting five- while sanctioning six-member juries. In fact, the
Court stated: "We readily admit that we do not pretend to discern
73
a clear line between six members and five."
Although much can be said for the Court's candor, criticism
like that above requires judicial attention. Given data equally critical of both jury models, the Court's invalidation of the jury system
in Ballew is inconsistent with its affirmance of the model in
Williams. Ballew prohibited further reduction in jury size, but ignored overwhelming evidence that the initial decision permitting
six-person juries was based on a shaky factual premise: that twelveand six-person juries were functionally equivalent.
Certainly, the data utilized by Justice Blackmun in Ballew
raises serious doubts about the Williams conclusion, since Williams
was premised on the lack of evidence suggesting meaningful distinctions between six- and twelve-person juries. 74 However, instead of reevaluating Williams in light of this evidence, the Court
hinted at a broader justification for reductions in jury size. In
Ballew examination of the functional differences between varioussized juries was only the first step in the Court's analysis.
Conceding that a reduction in jury size could have adverse consequences, the Ballew opinion suggests this inhibition on the jury
69. See generally notes 160 & 165 infra and studies cited therein.
70. 435 U.S. at 239.
71. Id.

72. Zeisel, Twelve is Just, TRIAL, Nov.IDec. 1974, at 13.
73.

435 U.S. at 239.

74. See notes 160 & 165 infra and studies cited therein. See also Ballew v,
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 n.10, 233 nn.11 & 12 (1978), and studies cited therein.
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function might yet be constitutional if supported by a valid state interest. 75 In Ballew this interest was the economic benefit derived
from savings in the daily allowances paid to jurors. 76 The Court determined that no substantial savings result when the number of jurors is reduced from six to five, 77 but suggested that there is a sig78
nificant savings when the change is from twelve to six.

If Ballew stands for the proposition that a balancing test is
necessary to judge the constitutionality of six-member juries, then
at first glance the Williams decision appears reconcilable with
Ballew. The monetary savings involved when the jury size is reduced from twelve to six is certainly more apparent than when the
change is from six to five, 79 although recent evidence suggests that
the savings is insubstantial in both cases.8s However, any rationale
for a reduction in jury size which relies on the economic benefit to
be derived 8l only undercuts the Court's decision in Ballew.
The implication inherent in this justification is that if the initial proposal had been a reduction from twelve to five jurors, it
would have been permissible, since the savings which result from
reducing the jury by seven jurors is greater than the savings which
result from reducing the jury by six. Thus the Court in Ballew did
not explore the full ramifications of its reasoning. In fact, the Court
overlooked the apparent implications of its analysis by using six instead of twelve as the starting point for measuring potential savings
which would result from juror reduction. However, it is illogical
for the Court to base its analysis on the savings involved when
changing from six to five jurors, since the core question involves
the permissibility of deviations from the historical twelve-member
model. By choosing to use six rather than twelve as the basis for
comparison, the Court, in effect, assumed the functional equivalence of twelve- and six-member juries, although it was not willing
75. 435 U.S. at 243.
76. Id. at 244.
77. Id. at 243-44.
78. Id. at 244.

79. Id.
80. The Court estimated "that a reduction from 12 jurors to 6 throughout the
federal system could save at least $4 million annually." Id. at n.39 (citing Zeisel,
supra note 72, at 13). However, Zeisel challenges the significance of this amount
since it represents only two percent of the total federal judicial budget and only
slightly more than the thousandth part of one percent of the total federal budget.
Zeisel, supra note 72, at 13. See also Pabst, Statistical Studies of the Costs of Six-

Man Versus Twelve-Man Juries, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 326 (1972).
81.

See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. at 244.
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to unequivocally maintain this position due to the post-Williams evi-

dence suggesting the opposite conclusion.8 2 At any rate, under the
Court's analysis, there is no reason why an initial change from
twelve to five jurors should not be sanctioned, and therefore a logical basis for distinguishing Williams from Ballew is still lacking.
Unanimity in Jury Verdict
In the companion cases of Johnson v. Louisiana 3 and Apodaca
v. Oregon,84 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
criminal convictions rendered by nonunanimous jury votes of nine
to three and ten to two, respectively.
The requirement of unanimity is arguably more crucial for
preserving the traditional common-law conception of jury trial than
is the requirement of a twelve-member jury. One commentator
compared the effects of reducing the number of jurors with the effects of dispensing with the requirement of unanimity: "[A] majority verdict requirement is far more effective in nullifying the potency of minority viewpoints than is the outright reduction of a
jury to a size equivalent to the majority that is allowed to agree on
a verdict."85 This commentator concludes that while reducing the
number of jurors is one type of "jury-enfeebling measure,"8' 6 abandoning the requirement of unanimity represents "reduction with a
vengeance."87 It is not suprising, therefore, that the Supreme
Court found the issues raised in the nonunanimous verdict cases
more divisive than those involved in the six-member panel decision.
In Johnson and Apodaca, the Court discussed both historical
and functional justifications for the requirement of unanimity. In
Johnson the Court discussed whether In re Winship,88 which held
that due process mandates that criminal convictions be imposed
82. See notes 160 & 165 infra and studies cited therein.
83. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
84. 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion). Throughout the following discussion, the companion cases of Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), and Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion), are treated as one decision, except
where noted. However, citations to the pertinent portions of these opinions will generally be to the Johnson opinion only, since Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Powell wrote opinons which were applicable to both cases, but
which were attached to the Johnson decision.
85. Zeisel, supra note 16, at 722.
86. Id. at 723.
87. Id. at 722.
88. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 8 9 requires unanimity
in criminal trials. The Court rejected the argument that a unanimous verdict is inherent in the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. 90 In Apodaca, the majority refused to accept the view

that the sixth amendment, applied to the states through the four-

teenth amendment, requires a unanimous verdict. 9 1
As in Williams, an overwhelming majority of the Court accepted the "ffull incorporation" view of the right to jury trial and
92
concluded that federal and state standards must be synonymous.

A majority also found that the sixth amendment requires a unanimous verdict in criminal proceedings. 93 Therefore, because there
was majority support for the propositions that the sixth amendment
requires a unanimous jury to convict a criminal defendant, and that
the sixth amendment applies fully to state criminal proceedings,
the Johnson and Apodaca Courts' sanctioning of the nonunanimous

jury verdict is anomalous. The result is explainable, however, by
the unusual alignment of viewpoints comprising the majority decision.

Seven Justices concluded that the sixth amendment applies
uniformly to both state and federal proceedings. However, four of

these Justices maintained that the sixth amendment does not mandate a unanimous verdict;94 three concluded that the sixth amend-

ment requires unanimous verdicts in state as well as federal criminal proceedings. 95 An eighth Justice, Justice Stewart, concluded

89. Id. at 364.
90. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359-62 (1972).
91. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411-12 (1972) (plurality opinion).
92. Id. (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.);
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in
Apodaca); id.at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in Apodaca). In all, the
Justices adhering to this viewpoint are Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas,
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
93. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J.,dissenting); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting also in Apodaca); id.
at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in
Apodaca); id.at 382-83, 391-92 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in Apodaca);
id. at 371 (Powell, J., concurring) (concurring also in Apodaca). The five Justices
adhering to this viewpoint are Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and
Powell.
94. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 406. Justice White delivered the plurality
opinion in which Burger, C.J., and Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., joined.
95. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (dissenting
also in Apodaca); id. at 495 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in Apodaca); id.
at 382-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in Apodaca).
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that the fourteenth amendment alone requires unanimity. 96 The
ninth member of the Court, Justice Powell, agreed that the sixth
amendment requires unanimity in federal trials, but did not find
this feature of the sixth amendment applicable to state criminal
proceedings. 97 Therefore, a majority resulted, albeit for different
reasons, that upheld the constitutionality of nine- and ten-out-oftwelve verdicts in state criminal proceedings.
Speaking for the Court in both Johnson and Apodaca, Justice
White subordinated the historical importance of unanimity to the
modem purposes served by the jury: "[A]s in Williams, our inability to divine the 'intent of the Framers' . . . requires that in
determining what is meant by a jury we must turn to other than
purely historical considerations." 98 Thus, the Court embarked on a
functional analysis of the relationship between the unanimity requirement and the modem purposes served by the jury.
The Court asserted that jury unanimity is not inherent in the
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard applied in all criminal
cases, concluding that "as to the nine jurors who voted to convict,
the State satisfied its burden of proving guilt beyond any reasonable doubt."9 9 Further, the Court found no reason to assume that
the majority jurors had not carefully considered the arguments of
the minority before reaching a verdict. 0 0 Based on the assumption
that any verdict rendered is the product of a meaningful deliberative process whereby a large majority of the jurors have become
convinced of the defendant's guilt, Justice White found "no basis
for denigrating the vote of so large a majority of the jury or for
refusing to accept their decision."'1 1
In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that permitting
nonunanimity diminishes the reliability of the jury by extracting
"from the jury room [an] automatic check against hasty factfinding
2
by relieving jurors of the duty to hear out fully the dissenters."'10
The other dissenters, Justices Brennan and Stewart, contended
that, absent a requirement of unanimity, "consideration of minority
views may become nothing more than a matter of majority

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 397-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
1M. at 369-80 (Powell J., concurring) (concurring also in Apodaca).
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion).
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 362.
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in Apodaca).
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grace,"' 03 thereby jeopardizing effective vindication of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of "universal participation of the citizenry in the administration of criminal justice.'1 0 4 Speaking for
the plurality, Justice White refused to give credence to these contentions and on the basis of available evidence noted that the
Court perceived "no difference between juries required to act
unanimously and those permitted to convict or acquit by votes of
10 5
10 to two or 11 to one."'
As in Williams, Justice White apparently based the Court's decisions in Johnson and Apodaca on the lack of substantiated evidence demonstrating significant operational differences between
unanimous and nonunanimous juries.' 0 6 This provoked a deluge of
empirical research, much of it casting doubt on the Court's underlying premise. 10 7 The validity of the Court's rationale for approving
nonunanimous jury verdicts is, therefore, unclear.
Five-out-of-Six Jury Verdicts
The jury system under review in Burch v. Louisiana'0 s combines nonunanimity and reduced panel size. Petitioner Burch was
convicted of violating an obscenity statute, a nonpetty offense, by a
jury vote of five to one. 10 9 Article 1, section 17, of the Louisiana
Constitution provides for six jurors, only five of whom must concur
to reach a verdict, in all cases "in which the punishment may be
confinement at hard labor or confinement without hard labor for
more than six months.""i 0
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of his conviction by
a five-out-of-six verdict after the Supreme Court held unanimous
five-member panels unconstitutional in Ballew v. Georgia."' He
argued that the Court's earlier decisions in Williams-sanctioning
the six-member jury-and Ballew-holding the five-member jury
unconstitutional-necessitates maintenance of the unanimity requirement.
103. Id. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in Apodaca).
104. Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
105. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 411 (plurality opinion).
106. See id.
107. See generally Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 n.10, 233 nn.11 & 12
(1978), and studies cited therein.
108. State v. Wrestle, Inc., 360 So. 2d 831 (La. 1978), cert. granted sub nom.
Burch v. Louisiana, 47 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-90).
109. 360 So. 2d at 833.
110. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17. For the full text of this provision, see note 15
supra.
111. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
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Since only five persons are required for conviction in a fiveout-of-six verdict system, petitioner contended that the rationales
used to invalidate convictions rendered by five-member juries are
equally applicable to his case. 1 12 He argued that if six jurors are
the minimum number necessary to provide a representative cross
section of the community under Ballew, allowing a verdict to be
rendered by five out of the six does not adequately insure that all
six members will meaningfully participate in the deliberative process. 1 13 Thus, petitioner maintained that the five-out-of-six verdict
system is tantamount to the five-member system invalidated in
Ballew.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected these contentions,
holding that Ballew was not dispositive. 1 14 The court reviewed the
Williams decision sanctioning six-member juries in criminal cases
and the Johnson and Apodaca holdings sanctioning nine- and tenout-of-twelve jury systems. The court reasoned that since ninetwelfths represents seventy-five percent concurrence, whereas fivesixths represents eighty-three percent concurrence, the five-out-of5
six verdict system is within the permissible limits of Johnson.1
Furthermore, the court found no reason to assume that the purposes served by having six jurors instead of five are "necessarily
defeated because the six-person jury's verdict may be rendered by
five instead of by six persons." 116 Although the Supreme Court of
Louisiana characterized the issue as a close one, it concluded that
since it is bound by a presumption of federal constitutionality of all
provisions of the state constitution, the presumption should prevail
in this borderline case. 117 This set the stage for Supreme Court
consideration of the most recent "jury-enfeebling measure."
BURCH V. LOUISIANA: FUTURE STATUS OF
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

In deciding Burch the Supreme Court of the United States
should invalidate the five-out-of-six verdict system permitted by
112.

First Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Appellants at 1-3, State v. Wrestle,

Inc., 360 So. 2d 831 (La. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Burch v. Louisiana, 47
U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-90).
113. Id. at 2-3.
114. State v. Wrestle, Inc., 360 So. 2d at 838.
115. Id. (quoting Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REv. 1, 56 n.300 (1974)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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the Louisiana constitution. There is no reason for the Court to indulge in an unwarranted assumption of constitutionality when
scrutinizing this state constitutional provision. The theories advanced by the Court in prior cases do not support the constitutionality of the Louisiana system; furthermore, the Court should be
wary of placing any additional enfeebling measures on the right to
jury trial.
Permitting further erosion of the essential features of a jury
will severely undercut the purposes served by incorporating the
various procedural safeguards outlined in the first eight amendments into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Concern for a high degree of fairness prompted the Court to extend the protections of the sixth amendment to the states in
Duncan v. Louisiana."-8 The Duncan rationale was meant to insure

criminal defendants in state proceedings a quality of treatment that
"is not necessarily fundamental to fairness in every criminal system
that might be imagined but is fundamental in the context of the
criminal processes maintained by the American States." 119 It would
make a mockery of this rationale if the original understanding of
the rights incorporated by the fourteenth amendment are watered
down to such an extent that the application of the federal constitution to state criminal proceedings becomes a meaningless formality.
Thus, the Supreme Court should not permit the present sixth
amendment definition of a jury to be further broadened to include
the five-out-of-six model.
Although the Court has upheld the constitutionality of the
unanimous six-person jury120 and the nonunanimous twelve-person
jury, 12 1 it does not follow that a nonunanimous six-member panel
is permissible. To the contrary, applying the nonunanimity feature
to the six-member panel is inconsistent with the theories expounded by the Court in permitting reduced jury size and nonunanimity. The justifications for these deviations from the traditional twelve-member unanimous model are mutually exclusive and
fail when asserted together.
The Court's decision concerning size requirements in Williams
118. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
119. Id. at 149 n.14.
120. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See text accompanying notes 53-61
supra.
121. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). See text accompanying notes 83-107 supra.
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predated Johnson and Apodaca,122 the first of the Court's decisions
to deal with the unanimity requirement. Thus the Court's analysis
in Williams was based only on a comparison of six- and twelvemember unanimous panels. Concluding that a reduction in jury
size does not alter the essential aspects of the right to jury trial,
the Court in Williams stated: "[W]e find little reason to think that
these goals [group deliberation and insuring cross-sectional representation] are in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved
when the jury numbers six, than when it numbers 12-particularly
if the requirement of unanimity is retained."'123 The Court's conclusion that the twelve-person requirement lacks historical significance
may be equally applicable to a historical analysis of the unanimity requirement. 1 4 However, in sustaining the six-person jury,
Williams relied on the functional congruities between the six- and
twelve-person models rather than on the lack of historical certainty
regarding the intent of the Framers. 125 In rejecting the claim that
a twelve-person panel is a necessary component of the jury, the
Court compared the unanimity and twelve-person requirements:
"[T]he former, unlike the latter, may well serve an important role
in the jury function, for example, as a device for insuring that the
Government bear the heavier burden of proof."126
Justice White's suggestion that the requirement of unanimity
has greater functional importance than the requirement of twelve
jurors is both logically and empirically compelling. Abolishing the
unanimity requirement in the six-person context would seriously
interfere with those factors that the Court in Williams and Ballew
deemed essential to safeguard effective operation of the jury. 127
The Court's primary concern in Ballew was that a change in
the number of jurors not affect the group's method or manner of
discussion.128 The Court concluded that a five-member panel is insufficient to insure effective group deliberation, even when the
product of the deliberative process must be a unanimous verdict. 129 Therefore, sequestering six jurors until unanimous agree122. Williams was decided in 1970; Johnson and Apodaca were decided in
1972.
123. 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See text accompanying note 60 supra.
124. See id. at 100 n.46.
125. Id. at 99-102. See text accompanying notes 55-61 supra.
126. Id. at 100 n.46.
127. Id. at 100; Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-37 (1978).
128. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-34 (1978).
129. Id. at 241.
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ment is reached is, thus far, the bare minimum demanded by the
Court to insure effective and meaningful group deliberations. Abolishing the unanimity requirement in the six-member context would
mean that the lowest acceptable standard is no longer met. This is
the necessary conclusion unless one accepts the extraordinarily illogical suggestion that no difference exists in the intensity of the
debate that must persuade six out of six rather than five out of six
jurors. 130 This assertion is contrary to normal expectations regarding human behavior. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent
in Johnson: "[H]uman experience teaches that polite and academic
conversation is no substitute for the earnest and robust argument
necessary to reach unanimity."' 3 ' Mandating unanimity to insure
full and complete debate has been considered so essential that,
prior to the Johnson and Apodaca decisions, it was persuasively argued, with support from the judiciary, that this right could not
even be waived by a criminal defendant.132
Moreover, numerous empirical studies demonstrate the impact
that removal of the unanimity requirement has on the jury process.
A comparison of mock juries required to act unanimously with
those permitted to act by a two-thirds majority vote shows that de1 33
liberation times are expedited when unanimity is not required.
These findings suggest that only cursory consideration is given to
dissenting views if they are not necessary for the group's ver34
dict.'
Fuithermore, the requirement enunciated in Williams, that a
verdict be rendered by a jury composed of a representative cross
section of the community,' 35 is thwarted if nonunanimity is permitted with six-member juries. Ballew concludes that the opportunity for meaningful and appropriate representation of minority
viewpoints is decreased below the constitutional minimum when
130.

But see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), where the Court per-

ceived "no difference between juries required to act unanimously and those permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to one." Id. at 411 (plurality
opinion).
131. 406 U.S. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
132. See Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953); Dickinson v.
United States, 159 F. 801 (1st Cir. 1908). See also Comment, Waiver of Jury
Unanimity-Some Doubts About Reasonable Doubt, 21 U. CI. L. REv. 438 (1954).
133. Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt & Meek, The Decision Processes of 6- and 12Person Mock Juries Assigned Unanimous and Two-Thirds Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH.

1 (1975).

134. Id. at 12.
135. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). See text accompanying note
60 supra.
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the jury is composed of only five members. 13 6 If a five-person
unanimous verdict is unconstitutional, it is inconsistent to argue
that simply adding one person can satisfy the representative crosssectional requirement of the fourteenth amendment. If one person
does not agree with the group's decision after examining the same
evidence and hearing the same testimony as the rest of the jury,
then he or she is not represented in the final verdict unless it can
be conclusively proven that the extra person's contributions were
fully and fairly considered by the other jurors. At the very least,
permitting nonunanimity in this context creates uncertainty
whether the essential purposes underlying the cross-sectional requirement are being fulfilled in light of the potential impotence of
minority viewpoints. 137 Due to the important values protected by
the cross-sectional requirement, this uncertainty alone should
render the five-out-of-six system invalid.138
There is a strong interrelationship between the analytically
separable requirements of having a jury composed of a representative cross section of the community and of having the group engage
in meaningful and complete deliberation.' 39 The complementary
nature of these features is most effectively realized when the jury
must act unanimously. As Justice Stewart stated in his dissent in
Johnson:
[O]nly a unanimous jury . . . selected [by an impartial system
which will insure cross-sectional representation] can serve to
minimize the potential bigotry of those who might convict on inadequate evidence, or acquit when evidence of guilt was clear..
. . The requirements of unanimity and impartial selection thus
complement each other in ensuring the fair performance of the
0
vital functions of a criminal court jury.14
Thus far, this Note has focused on the consequences that may
result when the six-member jury is permitted to render a
nonunanimous decision. Although abandonment of the unanimity
136. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 236-37, 239 (1978). See also id. at 245
(White, J., concurring).
137.

See text accompanying note 134 supra.

138. For discussion of the importance of the cross-sectional requirement, see
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
139. See generally Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 397-99 (1972) (Stewart,
J., dissenting); id. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in Apodaca);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). But see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
at 378-79 (Powell, J., concurring) (concurring also in Apodaca).
140. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 398 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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requirement in this context would be detrimental to the essential
functions of the jury, 141 the Supreme Court has sanctioned
nonunanimous jury verdicts in other contexts. 142 It is necessary to
demonstrate the inapplicability of the Court's analysis in the nineand ten-out-of-twelve verdict situations to the five-out-of-six context.
The Court in Johnson and Apodaca was deeply divided on
whether to permit nonunanimous verdicts in any context whatsoever. 143 Justice Brennan's comment, which summarized the
Court's affirmance of the convictions rendered by nonunanimous
twelve-member juries, is significant: "[Tioday's decision . . . [is not

inconsistent with a view] that only a unanimous verdict will afford
the accused in a state criminal prosecution the jury trial guaranteed
him by the Sixth Amendment."' The nature of the Johnson and
Apodaca majority-which resulted from Justice Powell's belief
that the sixth amendment, as applied to the states, does not require unanimity 45 and from Justice Blacknun's tentative concurring opinion'146-suggests the tenuous nature of the decisions.
Therefore, the Court may well resist any attempt to extend Johnson and Apodaca.
In his dissent in Johnson and Apodaca, Justice Marshall summarized his view of the Court's rationale: "The argument seems to
be that since, under Williams, nine jurors are enough to convict,
the three dissenters are mere surplusage."1 47 If this interpretation
of the Court's analysis is correct, then the five-out-of-six verdict
system should be automatically discarded: Under Ballew five jurors
are insufficient to convict a criminal defendant, and under Johnson
and Apodaca, given a nonunanimous verdict, dissenters are "mere
surplusage"; thus five jurors are too few to convict a criminal defendant in the five-out-of-six situation. Although this approach provides the simplest means to distinguish Burch from Johnson and
141.

See text accompanying notes 126-140 supra.

142. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). See also text accompanying notes 83-107 supra.
143. See note 92-97 supra and accompanying text.
144. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 395 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(dissenting also in Apodaca).
145. Id. at 369-80 (Powell, J.,concurring) (concurring also in Apodaca). See
also text accompanying note 97 supra.
146. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365-66 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (concurring also in Apodaca). See also text accompanying note 149 infra.
147. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 400-01 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(dissenting also in Apodaca).
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Apodaca, it does not fully respond to the points made by those
Justices voting with the Court in Johnson and Apodaca or in the
Louisiana Supreme Court's resolution of the issues raised in
Burch. 14 8 Furthermore, if Justice White meant to justify the decision by simply relegating the dissenting jurors to "mere surplusage," this would suggest that an eight-to-four or seven-to-five verdict model would be permissible. If dissenting jurors are merely
superfluous, then under Williams all that is needed is six concurring jury members. However, at least one member of the majority,
Justice Blackmun, conditioned his concurrence on the fact that " 'a
substantial majority of the jury' are to be convinced,"' 14 9 intimating
that the constitutional line should be drawn at nine to three. 150
Therefore, we must assume that the Court will not read the
Johnson and Apodaca decisions as demoting the dissenters to
"'mere surplusage" and invalidate the five-out-of-six verdict system
strictly on this basis. Rather, the Court will probably analyze the
five-out-of-six system by ascertaining its functional congruities to
presently sanctioned jury systems., 5 Even under this analysis, the
five-out-of-six model is constitutionally offensive.
Sanctioning nonunanimity in the six-member panel context involves far greater dangers than permitting nine-out-of-twelve and
ten-out-of-twelve jury verdicts. A mere comparison of the seventyfive percent concurrence in the nine-out-of-twelve system and the
eighty-three percent concurrence in the five-out-of-six system is
misleading. It overlooks a fundamental distinction between the two
variations. An eighty-three percent concurrence in the twelveperson jury context represents two dissenting jurors, whereas in
the six-member jury context it represents only one. This distinction
is crucial because psychological evidence demonstrates conclusively l 5 2 the importance to the proponent of a minority viewpoint

148. Burch was decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court under the name of
State v. Wrestle, Inc., 360 So. 2d 831 (La. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Burch v.
Louisiana, 47 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-90).

149. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(concurring also in Apodaca) (quoting id. at 362 (majority opinion)).

150. Id. at 366.
151. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 101-02 (1970). See also text accompanying notes 59-61, 98-101 supra.
152. When there is only one proponent of a minority viewpoint, group pressures will often result in the dissenting viewholder conforming to the majority view.
However, it is generally accepted by social psychologists that a sharp decrease in
conformity rates occurs when there are two, rather than one, minority viewholders.
See Edmonds, Logical Error as a Function of Group Consensus: An Experimental
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of at least one ally when presenting his or her arguments to the
majority. 15 3 Beginning with the Asch experiments' 54 reported in

the 1950's, it has been shown to be unlikely that a sole dissenter
will maintain his or her position in the face of a substantial majority

opposed to this view. 155 Even if the minority view proponent internally maintains a contrary view, a grave danger exists that, faced

with the majority view, this sole dissenter will change his or her
overt opinion to avoid appearing different. 1 56 However, the evidence is also clear that when the dissenter has at least one ally,
"the conformity rates . . . [fall] off dramatically, even though the
subjects [continue] to face absolutely large majorities against

them."' 15 7 Therefore, if the minority view is held by only one out
of six jurors, as opposed to two or three out of twelve jurors, there
is a severe risk that this viewpoint will not be fully and effectively

presented to the majority. The serious consideration that should be
given to all viewpoints is likely to be substantially less when an
opinion is expressed by only one member of a group than when
the same viewpoint is shared by two members of the group, even

if the absolute group size is doubled.
Study of the Effect of Erroneous Group Consensus Upon Logical Judgments of
Graduate Students, 43 Soc. FORCES 33 (1964); Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REv. 643
673-75 (1975); Saks, Ignorance of Science Is No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov./Dec. 1974, at 19.

See also note 154 infra and accompanying text.
153. See Lempert, supra note 152, at 673-74.
154. Ascb, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, in GROUP DYNAMICS 189 (2d ed. D. Cartwright & A. Zander 1960), cited
in Lempert, supra note 152, at 667 n.71. Lempert describes the initial Asch experiment as follows:
Asch required a subject to state which of three lines matched a criterion
line. Subjects responding alone made virtually no errors. However, when
naive subjects responded in a group after seven others, each of whom made
the same incorrect response, almost one third of the subjects responded incorrectly as well. In these conditions even those giving correct responses
evidenced considerable agitation. Post-experiment interviews revealed that
many of the conforming subjects had conformed only on the surface; they
bad continued to believe throughout the experiment that the group was
wrong but had changed their answers because they did not want to appear
different.
...Asch also found that if he added just one true respondent to the
group, the conformity rates of the naive subjects fell off dramatically, even
though the subjects continued to face absolutely large majorities against
them.
Lempert, supra note 152, at 673-74 (footnotes omitted).
155. See note 154 supra. See also Lempert, supra note 152, at 674-78; Saks,
supra note 152, at 19.
156. See Lempert, supra note 152; Saks, supra note 152.
157. Lempert, supra note 152, at 674 (footnote omitted).
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In addition, Justice Blackmun noted in Ballew that one of the
dangers involved in sanctioning further reductions in the size of
the jury is the chance that hung juries will decline, thus creating
"an imbalance to the detriment of one side, the defense."' 158 In
Williams the Court found "no discernible difference '15a between
decisions rendered by six- and twelve-person juries. Applying this
"no discernible difference" standard, the Court in Ballew was
compelled to invalidate a system that had an adverse effect on a
criminal defendant's chance for acquittal. Significantly, the data
relied on in Ballew-demonstrating the decreased likelihood of a
hung jury which results if the number of jurors is reduced below
six-is even more strikingly demonstrative of the danger to the defendant's chance for a hung jury when unanimity is not required
for the six-member panel. 160 Therefore, the Court's rejection in
Ballew of any change in the presently sanctioned jury models that
works to the detriment of the criminal defendant by decreasing the
chances for a hung jury is clearly relevant to the issue before the
Court in Burch.
Thus far it has been argued that criminal convictions rendered
by five-out-of-six jury votes have important functional consequences
which adversely affect the essential purposes of the right to jury
trial. It will be necessary to focus on the functional ramifications that
occur when the five-out-of-six system is utilized as long as the
Court adheres to the reasoning embodied in Williams, Johnson
161
and Apodaca, and Ballew.
When the Court decided Williams in 1970, it cited various
empirical studies purporting to show the functional equivalence
of six- and twelve-member panels. 162 When the Court decided
Johnson and Apodaca in 1972, it noted the lack of empirical data
comparing unanimous and nonunanimous juries, 163 stating that before the Court would "overturn a considered legislative judgment
158.
159.

Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 236 (1978).
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 (1970).

160. See Lempert, supra note 152, at 676-77; Zeisel, supra note 16, at 719-20.
See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 453-63 (3d ed. 1966).
161. See notes 60-72, 99-107 supra and accompanying text.
162. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 n.48 (1970). These studies were effectively discredited in Zeisel, supra note 16. For a further discussion of the adequacy of the research the Court has relied on in the jury diminution cases, see Zeisel
& Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. Cm.
L. REv.281 (1974).
163. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411, 413-14 (1972) (plurality opinion);
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1972).
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that unanimity is not essential to reasoned jury verdicts, we must
have some basis for doing so other than unsupported assumptions.' 1 6 4 By the time the Court decided Ballew in 1978, considerably more research was available, much of which had been developed in direct response to the assertions in prior cases. These
results render doubtful the major premises relied on in Williams
and Johnson and Apodaca.16 5 Moreover, that Justice Blackmun's
16 6
opinion in Ballew relied almost exclusively on social science data
suggests an increasing acceptance of empirical research by the
Court. Thus Ballew contains a major analytical flaw when read in
conjunction with Williams and Johnson and Apodaca. Although the
evidence cited in Ballew casts serious doubt on the functional abilities of the jury systems sanctioned in the prior decisions, no explanation was offered for the Court's willingness to utilize this data to
invalidate the five-person unanimous system, while reaffirming the
prior decisions. Commentators have suggested that since the original premises upon which the Court based its decisions have been
invalidated, these decisions should be reversed.1 67 This criticism is
especially applicable to Williams, where the Court explicitly based
its decision on the operational importance of the number of jurors. 1 68 However, the Court has decided to forego the opportunity
to reverse these cases, although the data cited in Ballew certainly
would have justified a decision to do so. It is evident that a majority of the Court does not consider empirical research the only factor that should be considered in reassessing the validity of either
Williams or Johnson and Apodaca, or in evaluating further deviations from the presently sanctioned jury models. Justice Powell's
concurrence in Ballew, which was joined by two other Justices,
demonstrates that some members of the Court are hesitant to base
constitutional decisions on empirical research alone:
I have reservations as to the wisdom-as well as the necessityof MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S heavy reliance on numerology de164.

Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972).

165. See generally Lempert, supra note 152; Saks, supra note 152; Zeisel, supra note 72; Zeisel, supra note 16; Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 162. See also
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 n.10 (1978).
166. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 n.10, 233 nn.11-15, 234 nn.16-18, 235
nn.19-22, 236 nn.23-26, 237 nn.27-29, 238 nn.30 & 31, 239 n.32 (1978).
167. E.g., Lempert, supra note 152, at 706-07; Note, The Effect of Jury Size on
the Probability of Conviction: An Evaluation of Williams v. Florida, 22 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 529, 554 (1971).
168. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1970). See text accompanying
notes 59-61 supra.
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rived from statistical studies. Moreover, neither the validity nor
the methodology employed by the studies cited was subjected to
the traditional testing mechanisms of the adversary process. The
studies relied on merely represent unexamined findings of persons interested in the jury system. 169
Researchers themselves have noted various shortcomings in
the empirical studies in this area. For example, the test situations
are inadequate to compare the operational differences of juries
varied by size and unanimity requirement. 1 70 Necessarily, direct
comparisons must be made under simulated conditions, since no
way exists to control the different types of cases that go to different
171
types of juries in the courtroom setting.
Another potential source of confusion arises from the lack of
any reason for assuming that varying features of the jury will make
a difference in every case. This creates the danger that cases in
which differences do occur will go undetected if they comprise
only a small percentage of the total cases. 1 72 Therefore, to get an
accurate portrait of differences that do occur, 1 73 it is necessary to
isolate the types of situations in which the characteristic attitudes
of jurors may make a difference and include only those cases in any
further studies. Although the percentage of cases in which varying
the features will make a difference may appear to be insignificant,
the absolute number of cases affected may be great.174 One researcher's results describe the cases in which differences will occur:
[W]hile the innocent-appearing defendant is unlikely to be convicted under any circumstances, the individual who appears to
be nearly guilty or can present only a weak defense runs a much
greater risk of conviction with the more lenient criteria or
smaller jury. The main concern is with the innocent individuals
in this latter category, i.e., those with a record of prior arrests or
with poor legal help who would lose much of the protection of
the 'reasonable doubt' restriction if conviction were made easier.
Therefore, relaxing the jury procedure to permit more actually

169. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
170. See Nagel & Neef, Deductive Modeling to Determine an Optimum Jury
Size and FractionRequired to Convict, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 933, 934-37.
171. See id. at 937-40.
172. See Lempert, supra note 152, at 648-53.
173. Id.
174. In id. at 653, Lempert estimates the proportion of cases in which jury size
has a reasonable probability of affecting jury verdicts at 14.1%.
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guilty individuals to be convicted will serve to markedly increase
the probability of convicting those who are actually innocent.175
The types of criminal defendants that will be affected by varying
the features of a jury must be kept in mind even if it appears that,
in terms of aggregate data comparisons, the percentage of cases affected is minimal. It is also important to note the problems inherent in any type of research that attempts to draw conclusions from
176
aggregate as opposed to selective jury data.
Thus, researchers as well as members of the Supreme Court
have noted various risks of blind acceptance of social science conclusions. 177 One commentator, in an article aptly entitled "Ignorance of Science is No Excuse," 178 has expressed incredulity at the
Court's apparent ignorance of social science techniques.' 79 The
problems associated with the Court's inability to adequately assess
the methodology or probe the validity of the underlying assumptions employed in the various studies have doubtless made the
Court skeptical of the results much of this research purports to
prove. This is especially true when one considers the avalanche of
criticism which the Court generated when it cited and apparently
relied on studies later shown to be untenable.'8 0 Therefore, the
Court's reluctance to base its decisions solely on social science research is understandable. However, one researcher has suggested
that since history clearly favors, if not mandates,' 8 ' the unanimous
twelve-member panel, the Supreme Court has placed on the
wrong party the burden of proving that deviations from this model
make a difference:
[T]hose who argue that jury size is not defined constitutionally,
because size does not affect verdicts and hence has no relationship to sixth and seventh amendment values, should have the
burden of empirically proving the lack of relationship. Instead,
the uncritical use of significance tests in jury-size research puts a
heavy burden of proof on partisans of the status quo.1 8 2

175. Friedman, Trial by Jury: Criteriafor Convictions, Jury Size and Type I
and Type II Errors, AM. STATISTIcIAN, Apr. 1972, at 22-23.
176. See notes 172-173 supra and accompanying text.
177. See generally Lempert, supra note 152; Nagel & Neef, supra note 170. See
also note 169 supra and accompanying text.
178. See Saks, supra note 152.

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 18-20.
See authorities cited note 165 supra.
See Lempert, supra note 152, at 660 n.55.
Id. at 661-62 (footnotes omitted).
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Justice Marshall voiced a similar criticism when he noted that
permitting deviations from the traditional common-law jury is necessarily an arbitrary course of action:
[T]here is nothing intrinsically wrong with drawing arbitrary
lines . . , [b]ut in cases where arbitrary lines are necessary, I
would have thought it more consonant with our limited role in a
constitutional democracy to draw them with reference to the
fixed bounds of the Constitution rather than on a wholly ad hoc
basis.
...The line must be drawn somewhere, and the difference between drawing it in the light of history and drawing it on
an ad hoc basis is, ultimately, the difference between interpreting a constitution and making it up as one goes along. 183
Given that the jury had survived, until very recently, in virtually
the same form described by Blackstone in the eighteenth century,'8 4 the Court should not have assumed that the size and unanimity requirements are merely "accidental features."'18 5 At the
very least, the Court should have created a rebuttable presumption
regarding the necessity of these features to safeguard the sixth
amendment guarantee. In any event, the Court should not sanction
further deviations from the traditional jury model absent a clear
showing that sixth amendment values are not threatened.
A final point that needs attention is the suggestion made by
Justice Blackmun in Ballew that, even if a change in the structure
of the jury "inhibits the functioning of the jury as an institution to
a significant degree,"' 8 6 the change may nevertheless be justifiable
if "any state interest counterbalances and justifies the disruption so
as to preserve its constitutionality.' 8 7 Since financial benefits result from fewer jurors drawing daily allowances,' 8 savings would
not occur in the nonunanimous situation because all the jurors receive the same stipend. The only monetary savings that could conceivably occur would stem either from shorter deliberation periods
or reduction in the number of hung juries, which result in the re183.

Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 181-82 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)

(citation omitted).
184. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
185.
186.

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 (1970).
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 (1978).

187. Id.
188.

Id. at 244.
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h-ying of cases. However, as has been noted earlier, 189 both these
situations endanger important sixth amendment values. Therefore,
any potential savings that could result from the five-out-of-six jury
verdict model is substantially outweighed by competing considerations which are essential to the proper functioning of the jury.
CONCLUSION

The five-out-of-six jury verdict model should be declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Burch v. Louisiana. In
light of the important sixth and fourteenth amendment values at
stake, the Court should be extremely wary of sanctioning further
deviations from the historically rooted unanimous twelve-person
model.
Although the Court was cavalier in asserting that both
nonunanimous twelve-person juries and unanimous six-person panels are equivalent to the traditional unanimous twelve-member
jury, the Justices were in frll agreement in Ballew v. Georgia that
a unanimous five-member jury is constitutionally offensive. Significantly, Ballew is the most recent decision concerning "jury enfeebling measures"; it is the only decision in this area in which the
Justices were undivided in their holding. Therefore, Ballew may
reflect a heightened awareness by the Court of the dangers posed
by further relaxations on the constitutional components of the jury.
The Court should continue this trend and invalidate the five-out-ofsix verdict model to insure that the essential purposes of the sixth
amendment right to jury trial are not further infringed.
Dolores Fredrich
189.

See notes 128-34, 158-60 supra and accompanying text.
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